I read the free chapter and had some issues with it -- I think I vented to _refugee_ about it -- but it was interesting and I would like to read the rest.

Non-financial incentives are important too. Here's the Freakonomics example:

In Haifa, day care centers almost uniformly closed at 4pm, and simply depended on the good intentions of parents to pick up their kids on time. Somehow, this worked: parents picked up their children on time and rarely, if ever, came after 4:30pm.

...Uri ran an experiment: Out of 10 daycare centers across Haifa, they randomly chose six and introduced a small fine for parents who showed up more than 10 minutes late in each of them. In day cares where the fine was introduced, parents immediately started showing up late, with tardiness levels eventually leveling out at about twice the pre-fine level. That is, introducing a fine caused twice as many parents to show up late. What about the remaining four day care centers that remained fine-free? Tardiness didn’t change at all.

The picture that emerged from this experiment, co-authored with Aldo Rustichini, was that parents had a whole set of non-financial incentives for being on time – incentives that were completely incompatible with money. Like, for example, avoiding the guilt of inconveniencing the day care workers. As soon as parents had the option to pay a small fine and avoid that guilt, they took it en masse.

The current arrangement seems to be working out with blood; it doesn't sound like there is a shortage. (Though distribution appears to be very much market-based once it is collected, and judging from the effort the Red Cross makes to guilt me into keeping them out of the red, they are well-motivated.)

The argument for a kidney market is stronger. In fact, it's a slam dunk. I've been wanting to post about it, and will probably get around to it next year.