- Consequently, the physical laws are nothing but a low-pass filter for small values of Kolmogorov Complexity.
Gotta love arxiv. Still getting my head around the meaning of this. It seems so language dependent, and not just computer language. IsDefinition: The Kolmogorov complexity of a string , denoted is the length of the shortest program which outputs given no input.
a name for 01010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101? (Not asserting it is, just not sure that it isn't.) print "01" * 25
- Gotta love arxiv.
I take that paper quite seriously. That initial def is relative to the language (of course). But reducible to universal turing machine L (as he goes on to prove a bit further down.) Note the the "+ O(1)" / "+ c". That's the language relative bit and it is O(1). http://bit.ly/IooFpk The above is quite elegant and to the point. K_sub_L is the irreducible universal construct. K_sub_L_prime the interpreter. If it helps, consider that number has no (representational) "base" but numeric form does. So, as an analogy, one can say Na > Nb. Naturally the inequality will hold in Na_base_x > Nb_base_x. Various bases will result in distinct length of the form. If further helps, consider the notion of image and its distinction from essence.It seems so language dependent
- I take that paper quite seriously.
Don't get me wrong. I don't have a deep enough understanding to judge the paper. I just love arxiv because it is a sounding board for ideas that otherwise would have a much smaller audience. Only on arxiv can you find conclusions like that. I read this through once, and I need to again. There are certain parts that I am attracted to: This is something sensible to me. I've been long thinking on the inextricable link between matter and space, and I like the fact that this brings irreversibility into the relationship. But, I am only beginning to absorb this. Some immediate questions: What defines the collection of Maxwellian Robots, and what is being filtered? Does this describe the nature of physicality, or is it a useful analogy? To the descriptive end, the causality seems the most compelling part, but can something fall out of it that maps onto the physical laws? I'd love to have a beer over this. I need someone to sit down and walk me through it. I don't think the nebulae/Shrodinger’s equation solutions is strongly supportive. It feels like cherry-picking.The output of the Maxwellian Robot is collection of points (subset) in some space. They self-replicate or self-print the space. Their motion is the generation of the space, or the printing of the space.
I personally found that brilliant. Very intriguing. We share the same questions. You are the biologist: how many neurons must we rub together to get a basic Turing Machine? No, no, I would say that that conversation clearly calls for GanJah.I'd love to have a beer over this. I need someone to sit down and walk me through it.
- You are the biologist: how many neurons must we rub together to get a basic Turing Machine?
Seems 11 might do the trick. (PDF) Oh no, I get far too silly. All sorts of confusion and even a bit of paranoia. It took me a while before I decided it just wasn't going to work out between the two of us. :) Working through this discussion...No, no, I would say that that conversation clearly calls for GanJah.
- Seems 11 might do the trick. (PDF)
Thanks! It will have to wait for this evening. That's fine, but just remember to don't criticize it ;-)Oh no, I get far too silly. All sorts of confusion and even a bit of paranoia. It took me a while before I decided it just wasn't going to work out between the two of us. :)
- how many neurons must we rub together to get a basic Turing Machine?
I think the more neurons you put together, the less like a Turing Machine your system will look. The firing of each has a stochastic component that combines in some way (I don't exactly know how, but probably something less than purely additive) with its neighbors. The uncertainly is too high to be a Turing machine; its the reason you can't throw a dart the same way each time.
- ...if there ever was a viable avenue of pursuing the relationship between consciousness and materiality, this is it. Don't you agree?
I'll give a qualified "yes" to this question. Here's the qualification: I think it is wise to look for a connection between consciousness and materiality in some conceptual, perhaps mathematical (perhaps purely philosophical, although I find that much less appealing), framework. Whether its this particular one, I can't say, because I don't understand his logic entirely yet. But I certainly grant that I like his approach. I think the manner in which consciousness is broached in neuroscience is one of the great scientific farces of the day (and its also one of the most romanticized, unfortunately). The attempts to atomize consciousness to statements like "your occipital cortex merges image for you", or "your amygdala gives you 'fight-or-flight' instructions" make me sick to my stomach. There is not one sensible statement that grants faculties to the brain itself, yet that is the norm in neuroscience. We, as individulas, are conscious beings, whether purely material or material-metaphysical. I hope one day we can discover a conceptual framework in which this idea can be interpreted, but I know beyond doubt that it will never be discovered by a traditional neuroscientist.
- I think the manner in which consciousness is broached in neuroscience is one of the great scientific farces of the day ..
The 'just so' science. I share your revulsion regarding this matter. An entirely chance phenomena? Consider the socio-political dimensions ..... (and its also one of the most romanticized, unfortunately).